Males and females evolved distinct life-history strategies, reflected in diverse life-12 history traits, summarized as sexual dimorphism. Life-history traits are highly interlinked. 13 The sex that allocates more resources towards offspring is expected to increase its life 14 span, and this might require an efficient immune system. However, the other sex might 15 allocate its resources towards ornamentation, and this might have immunosuppressive 16 effects. Activity of immune response may not be specific to the sex that produces the 17 eggs but could correlate with the amount of parental investment given. Informed by 18 experimental data, we designed a theoretical framework that combines multiple life-19 history traits. We disentangled sex-biased life-history strategies from a particular sex to 20 include species with reversed sex-roles, and male parental investment. We computed the 21 lifetime reproductive success from the fitness components arising from diverse sex-biased 22 life-history traits, and observed a strong bias in adult sex ratio depending on sex-specific 23 resource allocation towards life-history traits. Overall, our work provides a generalized 24 method to combine various life-history traits with sex-specific differences to calculate the 25 lifetime reproductive success. This was used to explain certain empirical observations as 26 a consequence of sexual dimorphism in life-history traits. 27 28 lifetime reproductive success, adult sex ratio 29 life-history traits. Theoretical models assessing the interaction of multiple life-history traits are 33 thus crucial to understand organisms' overall life-history and how they impact fitness. Theoretical 34 and experimental studies have shown how multiple life-history traits define an individual's lifetime 35 reproductive success (Moore
fitness components from parental investment, immune system and ornamentation are offspring success, survival of the parent plus offspring and mating success, respectively. These contribute to an individual's lifetime reproductive success. We assumed that Sex 1 provides more parental investment (PI) than Sex 2. The sex-specific fitness from parental investment is modeled as frequency dependent since the number of copulations in one sex depends on the availability of the other sex. The individuals within a sex also have different levels of ornamentation, which they use to attract individuals of the other sex as potential mates. The model uses evolutionary game theory which gives frequency dependent fitnesses of two types of individuals: those with more and those with lesser levels of ornaments. The individuals also differ in their immune genotypes. Each immune genotype yields a certain immunity-related fitness value that depends on the type and number of different immune alleles. The strength of immune response differs between sexes (sexual immune dimorphism). We modeled the evolution of these immune genotypes using population dynamics. Finally, the fitness obtained from parental investment, ornamentation and immune response were used to measure the lifetime reproductive success of an individual.
Immunity-related fitness Figure 2: Schematic representation of different scenarios of sex-specific differences in host immunityrelated fitness versus immune allelic diversity. We considered three distinct immune genotypes A 1 A 1 , A 1 A 2 , and A 2 A 2 that result from mating between individuals having one immune gene locus A with two alleles A 1 and A 2 (Mendelian segregation, see ESM). Fitness positively correlates with the number of different alleles or allelic diversity (Apanius et al., 1997; Eizaguirre et al., 2009). So genotypes A 1 A 1 and A 2 A 2 (homozygotes) will have the same fitness value as they both have only one type of allele. But A 1 A 2 (heterozygote) which has two different types of alleles will have a higher fitness. This is known as heterozygous advantage and occurs within both sexes. However, between the sexes, there can be sex-specific differences (Roved et al., 2017) . This is shown in panels (A), (B) and (C). In (A), Ω > 0 would imply that Sex 1 will have a higher value of immune response as compared to Sex 2 for any given allelic diversity. When Ω < 0, Sex 1 has a lower values of immune response for any given allelic diversity as compared to Sex 2. Another situation is also possible: Sex 1 can have higher immune response for a homozygous locus, and lower immune response for a heterozygous locus when compared to Sex 2. This shown in (B), where Θ is the difference between the angles of the two lines. In (C), ∆ differs from Ω by considering lines that are not parallel to each other i.e. case C is a combination of cases A and B. When both sexes have the same immune response patterns, Ω = Θ = ∆ = 0.
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88
The lifetime reproductive success i.e. the overall fitness of an individual, is related to its immuno- For two immune gene loci A and B each having two alleles A 1 ,A 2 and B 1 ,B 2 , there would be ten distinct zygote genotypes. The population will comprise of individuals with these genotypes. Their immune responses would depend on these genotypes. 
where W is the average population fitness. Figure 2 . The ornamentation game is neutral, i.e. no selection acting on it (details in the ESM). As maintained throughout this study, Sex 1 does maximum PI. Sex 2 does negligible PI. Therefore, its cost is set to zero i.e. c P = 0. The black line highlights the even adult sex ratio i.e. 1:1. In (A), (B) and (C): When the cost of PI = 0 and there is no sex difference in immune response (Ω = ∆ = Θ = 0), the obtained adult sex ratio is 1:1. In (A) and (C): when PI increases, the frequency of Sex 1 drops as PI is costly. When Ω > 0 and ∆ > 0, this sex difference in immune response compensates for the cost of PI. The fall in frequency of Sex 1 is lower than when Ω = 0 and ∆ = 0 and Sex 1 has higher frequency than Sex 2 for most values of PI cost. However, when Ω < 0 and ∆ < 0, Sex 1's frequency decreases with an increase in PI. In (B): Frequency of Sex 1 is lower than Sex 2 for most values of PI cost for most Θ values. Moreover, Θ < 0 and Θ > 0 give the same results. The above results highlight the fact that sexual conflict within immune allelic diversity can increase (when Ω > 0 and ∆ > 0 ) or reduce (when Ω < 0, δ < 0, almost all Θ) the adult sex ratio. and there is no sex-biased difference in immune response, we observe that the sex ratio is 1 : 1. Here, 163 we focus on the adult sex ratio (ASR) (Kokko and Jennions, 2008). The classical definition of ASR 164 is number of males:total number of males and females, but in our Sex 1 could be male or female.
165
In this manuscript the term ASR is defined as the ratio between Sex 1 and Sex 2. Since in every to the other sex. In this setup, the heterozygous immune genotype (A 1 A 2 ) has a higher immune 174 response than the homozygous genotypes A 1 A 1 and A 2 A 2 ( Figure 3 ). Thus, an increase in heterozy-175 gotes within one sex compared to the other would also mean that this sex has a higher mean activity Figure 5 : Qualitative difference in the adult sex ratio for diverse polygamous species with varying parental investment (PI) and ornamentation costs. As defined throughout the manuscript, Sex 1 is the major PI provider. For these calculations, we used the sexual conflict Case 4 shown in Figure 3 . (A) Species such as sticklebacks where one sex performs both ornamentation and most PI. We observe that frequency of Sex 1 descends as its PI cost increases and this further decreases with a rise in its ornamentation cost. (B) The panel highlighted in gray shows bi-parental investment scenarios. In species where Sex 1 does most PI and Sex 2 performs elaborate mating competitions, the frequency of Sex 1 reduces with increasing PI. However, this value grows with ascending ornamentation cost in Sex 2.
Note that for certain ornamentation and PI values, the adult sex ratios are equal. As shown by previous studies on multiple interactions between traits (Venkateswaran and Gokhale, 2019), even in the case where the cost of ornamentation is equal to zero in the mating competition game, the mere presence of that game will deviate the frequency of Sex 2 from a scenario where there is no ornamentation game.
In • the optimal diversity of immune alleles for both sexes is the same but the immune responses 189 at this optimal diversity could be different (for instance, females are more prone to acquir- 
S.1 One locus, two alleles
Let the fitnesses of the three genotypes be A 1 A 1 , A 1 A 2 and A 2 A 2 are W 1 , W 2 and W 3 . The frequencies of the three genotypes are denoted by x 1 , x 2 and x 3 Thus,
Similarly,
The W s could be survivability (viability) or fertility or both. Under neutrality they are all equal to 288 unity (Otto and Day, 2007).
289
S.2 Separate population into males and females 290
If the population is separated into the two sexes, Sex 1 which could be male (or female) denoted by 291 a solid circle symbol •, and Sex 2 which could be female (or male) denoted by a diamond symbol .
292
We stick to calling the sexes as Sex 1 and Sex 2 instead of males and females (and we also do not use 293 the standard and symbols as it might be misleading) because we want to show a generalized 294 idea of the dependence of sexual immune dimorphism on the amount of parental investment (or 295 mating competition and other factors) given and not to the sex itself.
296
For Sex 1, let frequency of
Similarly, for Sex 2, let frequency of A 1 A 1 = x 1 , frequency of A 1 A 2 = x 2 and frequency of 
where W is the average fitness of all genotypes. Also, x •i and x i is the change in frequencies of 307 the genotypes i (for the different sexes) with time. Also, here we assume equal sex ratio; half of the 308 offspring are males and the other half, females.
(S.5)
S.3 Mating competition 312
Mating competition is performed through fights, sexual signals, nuptial gifts, ornament display and 313 various types of attractiveness. We shall refer to all of these as 'ornaments'. Let's assume there are 314 individuals of two types in this interaction: ones that display more ornaments (MO) and ones that 
318
We model this interaction as an evolutionary game (Maynard Smith, 1986; Sigmund and Nowak, 319 1999). The payoff matrix is written as,
where b O is the benefit arising from mating competitions i.e. mating gain and c O is the cost that Sex 2 bears to maintain ornament(s). The frequency dependent fitnesses resulting from these 322 interactions are given by,
The payoff matrix (S.6) is an interaction between a pair of individuals i.e. two player game. We can 
where k is the number of M O (More Ornament) players and n is the total number of players. k 328 and n can vary between the sexes. These are given by, types of individuals whose frequencies can be just described by x i for i = {1, 2, 3, ...9} and their 348 respective average fitnesses are denoted by W i (for i = {1, 2, 3, ...9}).
349
Using the above given equations we have,
The classical selection equation (Crow and Kimura, 1970; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998) that 351 gives the evolution of each type (see Figure S .1) is then obtained by taking the time derivative of 352 (S.13) given by,
The frequencies of all types reach an equilibrium value at some time point. This is our value of 354 interest that is used in the results throughout this ESM and the main article.
355
The frequencies of each sex is a summation of frequencies of all types of individuals in a sex. When condition A is met, but Sex 1 also performs parental investment, while Sex 2 does not. (C) When conditions A and B are met, and Sex 2 also exhibits ornamentation. The sex-specific traits evolve over generation (time) by selection and therefore, get passed on to subsequent generations (for example, case C is shown in Figure S .1). Therefore, even when the sex ratio is kept equal among offspring at every generation, their sex-specific characteristics change their frequency in the population.
S.5 Two loci having two alleles each S.5.1 Population dynamics with separation of population into males and females
For Sex 1, let the frequency of
x •10 . Similarly, for Sex 2.
375
From Mendelian population dynamics (as done in the one locus case), the frequency of the 376 homozygotes in Sex 1 will be: (S.18) Frequency of the single heterozygotes will be: (S.24) Here, the W i s are the fitnesses of each genotype i with frequency x i and W is their mean fitness.
Similarly, we can obtain the frequencies of the genotypes in Sex 2. When Ω = 0, there is so sexspecific difference in immune response. There is no effect of ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on the ratio of allele diversity. However, Ω has an effect on this ratio. All factors: coat of PI, cost of ornamentation and Ω have an effect on the frequency of the sexes. Thought the effect of Ω is not profound, the cost of ornamentation in Sex 2 and cost of PI in Sex 1 reduce their frequency, respectively. When Θ = 0, there is so sex-specific difference in immune response. The parameter Θ has an effect on the allele diversity ratio. But there is no effect of ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on this ratio. There is no effect of Θ on the frequency of Sex 1. The cost of ornamentation in Sex 2 increases the frequency of Sex 1 while the cost of PI decreases its frequency. 20
Ratio of Heterozygotes/ Homozygotes in
Ratio of Heterozygotes/ Homozygotes in Sex 1 Frequency of Sex 1
Cost Figure 2 . in the main article. It represents the sex-specific fitness effect (that also includes the effect of diversity on sex-specific fitness) of Sex 1 relative to Sex 2. When ∆ = 0, there is so sex-specific difference in immune response. There is no effect of ornamentation and parental investment (PI) on the ratio of allele diversity. But ∆ has an effect on this ratio. As observed in the previous figure, here too, the cost of ornamentation in Sex 2 and cost of PI in Sex 1 reduce their frequency, respectively while the effect of ∆ is not as profound.
